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“One World, One Dream” or “One Game, Different Dreams”?
This piece was originally posted at Policy Innovations and has been reprinted here with permission of
the author.
By James Farrer
A “silver medal” for the Beijing Olympics from the Japanese media
Mo Bangfu, a Chinese columnist writing for the liberal Asahi Shimbun, used his weekly column the day
before the closing ceremonies to award the Beijing Olympics a symbolic “silver medal” for its overall
organization (Aug. 23, 2008, p. B3). Despite accusations of fakery, the opening ceremonies and the
Olympic volunteers both deserve “gold medals,” as do the ordinary Beijing residents and migrant
workers who had to put up with massive everyday inconveniences.
The government, however, deserves a “disqualification” for not allowing any demonstrations in the
designated demonstration areas, for restricting the access of normal citizens to the Olympic venues,
and also “poor marks” for the large numbers of empty seats at events. As a whole, Mo suggests, the
Beijing Olympics deserve a “silver medal,” perhaps summing up the generally positive appraisal of
some of the more liberal media voices in Japan. Conservative papers, however, gave the Beijing
Olympics much lower marks.
Seeing the Olympics as a watershed event, Japanese commentators have speculated about a “postOlympic” China, and their prognoses are generally darker than the more optimistic views in the U.S.
media. Influenced by Japan’s own postwar experience, columnists ask whether the Beijing Olympics
will serve the purpose of integrating China into global society, in the same way achieved by the former
Axis powers in the postwar Rome, Tokyo, and Munich Olympics, and later by Seoul in 1988. Most
answer negatively. Despite a consensus “silver medal” for a brilliant (if somewhat flawed) show, the
Olympics were regarded as a political failure by most Japanese commentators, at least when judged
by democratic norms. More darkly, some conservative papers suggest, the Olympics should be seen
as a great “success” for the legitimacy of authoritarian rule in China.
In a front-page summary of the impact of the Olympics on China, the conservativeSankei
Shimbun suggested that the Olympics were a celebration of dictatorship and the effectiveness of
totalitarian government, “a celebration turning its back on democratization” (Aug. 25, 2008, p. 1). The
article suggests that the Beijing Olympics should be compared to neither the 1964 Tokyo Olympics nor
the 1988 Seoul Olympics, both of which led to greater democratization and the integration of Japan
and Korea into the club of democratic states. Rather, the editors conclude, China’s Olympics may in
retrospect look more like the 1980 Moscow Olympics, which signaled political isolation and the internal
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Like many conservative voices in Japan, the Sankei emphasizes the
fragile state of the Chinese economy, predicting much bigger troubles, even a “hard landing” for
China’s “bubble economy” (Aug. 25, 2008, p. 1, “After the Olympics: a mountain of problems for
China’s economy”).
Even the more liberal Asahi Shimbun described the opening ceremony as a “political show for the
party leadership,” (Aug. 9, 2008, p. 2) pointing to the important role played by Communist Party
leaders in every public event leading up to the Olympics. The article claims that in every city passed
through on the torch relay, the first torch bearer was always the local Party secretary. As the Games
opened, Asahi guest columnist and liberal academic Fujiwara Koichi judged Zhang Yimou’s elaborate
opening ceremony as a “vacuous” political exercise. He writes, “It’s a sad sight to see this brilliant
director expending his talents on this exaggerated display of tradition and political propaganda.”

Despite the emptiness of its political slogans, Fujiwara continues, it was important that the world
participated in the Games in order to build bridges with the Chinese people, who can bring about real
change in their government (Asahi Shimbun, Aug. 24, 2008, p. 27, “Vacuous, but engagement is
important”). The closing Olympic editorial in the Asahi Shimbun, although more moderate in tone, also
called for political reform in China and asked the Chinese state to give some substance to the “One
World, One Dream” motto by joining the global society in the fight against global warming (Aug. 25,
2008, p. 3 “Make steps toward political reform”).
Much of this criticism mirrors the English-language media, but there are some differences. Japanese
media reports seem at the same time more critical and less condescending than their U.S.
counterparts. Japanese seem to expect more of their giant neighbor but are also far more fearful and
skeptical of it. This dynamic is especially evident in the profound mistrust in Japan’s mainstream
media toward Chinese political leadership and the insistence by some conservative Japanese
commentators that China is headed for a severe economic downturn. These pessimistic economic
predictions are significant if only because Japan is the largest foreign investor in China, which is now
Japan’s largest export market. Of course, Japan’s reports also say a great deal about Japan’s own
obsessions, including concerns about Japan’s declining vitality and status in comparison with its
increasingly powerful and affluent “neighboring country” (a term frequently used in Japanese media).
“One World, One Dream” or “One Games, Different Dreams”?
The motto of the Chinese Olympics was “One World, One Dream” (tongyige shijie, tongyige
mengxiang). But it might be more appropriate to have named the Olympics after another expression,
“one bed, different dreams” (tongchuang yimeng), a Chinese idiom used to refer to two people sharing
a bed but dreaming different dreams. Looking at the hypernationalist coverage of the Olympics in the
United States and China, Olympic historian David Wallechinsky describes “parallel games,” in which
Americans and Chinese were essentially watching their own teams perform in highly selective national
media coverage. But this “one games, different dreams” phenomenon is not limited to the
hypernationalistic U.S. and Chinese media. Japan’s media also focused almost exclusively on the
events that featured participation by Japanese athletes.
The Olympics seen on Japanese television were fundamentally Japan’s Olympics. Just as the Olympics
seen by Americans and Chinese were fundamentally nationalist versions of the same global event. It
seems that even small countries are not immune to Olympic nationalism. A report in the New York
Timesdocuments the “gold medal fever” in several countries around the world, including Mongolia,
India, Indonesia, and Jamaica. Of course, some of the superstar accomplishments—such as Michael
Phelps and Usain Bolt breaking records—were truly global media events, but for most viewers in the
world, including those in Japan, this Olympics was a case of “same games, different dreams,” in a
televised experience characterized by highly selective media nationalism.
Can fulfilling the “100 year dream” mean an end to “100 years of national humiliation”?
It’s clear from the nationalist narratives and folkloric themes of the opening and closing ceremonies
that the “dream” that concerned the Beijing Olympic organizers was not a generic dream of “one
world” but rather the much more specific dream of China’s place in that world. This “one hundred year
dream” of a Chinese Olympics is tied to another story of a “hundred years of national humiliation,” a
story in which China interprets its modern history as an underdog struggle against foreign aggression,
beginning with the Opium Wars and punctuated by a series of invasions.
In what might signal an important revision of this story of national revival, state media giant
Xinhua’s reporting narrates the Olympics as the culmination of 30 years of “reform and opening,”
suggesting that 1978 be recognized as the new key turning point in Chinese history, in a new
narrative of Chinese history based not on the mythology of national humiliation and resistance but on

a myth of national self-renewal and openness to the world. If this story sticks, it signals a constructive
revision of Chinese national identity.
Mirroring this official story, the New York Times suggests that China’s newly won confidence might
represent the beginning of the end of a pattern of “aggrieved nationalism” based on the story of
national humiliation. The Times article cites the positive and welcoming attitude of Beijingers toward
foreign visitors as evidence that the Olympics bestowed a new confidence on China that can lead to
the diminishment of China’s aggrieved nationalism. The article quotes Fudan University Professor Shen
Dingli, who suggests that the success of the Olympics will allow China to become a “normal country”
that can more objectively view its strengths and its weaknesses.
The sense of grievance at the base of Chinese nationalism may be hard to overcome. Media in Japan,
which is undoubtedly the country most closely associated with China’s “century of humiliation” and
also the most common target of China’s nationalist grievances, seemed to show a much greater
skepticism about the potential for Chinese people to use the Olympics to overcome the politics of
national humiliation.
Despite the positive spin surrounding the Games, Japanese media tended to interpret the nationalist
imagery of the opening ceremonies and China’s single-minded pursuit of Olympic gold as yet more
signs of China’s potent mix of populist nationalism and authoritarianism. Japan’s conservative
newspapers interpreted China’s Olympic-fueled nationalism as a useful strategy for solidifying political
control and legitimating political dictatorship by the Chinese Communist Party.
The conservative Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s most widely circulated daily, suggested that problems
such as a slowing economy, declining real estate prices, and greater income inequality will necessitate
a resort to hard-line political tactics (Aug. 25, 2008, p. 2 “A return to the hard line”). Not all Japanese
commentators were so pessimistic. One Asahi commentary suggested that the relatively neutral and
normal diplomatic exchanges between China and Japan could be the sign of a new “adult relationship”
(Aug. 24, 2008, p. 4, “The sprouting of an ‘adult relationship’ between China and Japan”).
It is troubling that mainstream media in the one nation that could do the most to help China overcome
its “aggrieved nationalism” seem the least optimistic about this possibility. American media have been
quicker to embrace 1978 as the new starting point for contemporary Chinese history, with the
Olympics as a 30th anniversary celebration of the opening and reform that began that year.
Faking the Olympics
“Fakery” was perhaps the most unfortunate theme of the Beijing Olympics. An editorial in the Yomiuri
Shimbun reflected on Chinese Olympic “fakes,” such as the use of computer-generated imagery and
voice-overs in the opening ceremony, suggesting that, like the obsession with winning gold medals,
these practices also reflect the methods of a totalitarian government in which ends justify means
(Aug. 25, 2008, p. 3, “As the festival ends, the real trials begin”). Even the more liberal media
suggested that the Chinese were “trying too hard,” resulting in a less than authentic celebration of the
Olympic spirit.
As in the West, Japanese media also reported on Chinese media censorship, but with some twists that
were not common in U.S. reporting. The Asahi‘s coverage of media censorship focused not only on
censorship but also on the concrete methods of Chinese authorities in constructing an approved
Olympic message. Reporters from Xinhua and CCTV dominated the Chinese corps, with very few slots
remaining for local and regional Chinese media. Some well-known investigative reporters were simply
told not to work during the Olympics. The Chinese state wanted no independent media scoops in this
Olympics. The worry expressed in these stories is that Chinese popular attitudes are easily
manipulated by a still-powerful state which is able to micromanage media messages (“Chinese
domestic media restrictions” Asahi Shimbun, Aug. 15, 2008, p. 2; “Chinese media” Aug. 25, 2008,
evening, p. 1).

This emphasis on the state construction of media messages may sound exaggerated in China’s
Internet age, but Hong Kong–based media expert Rebecca MacKinnon makes a related cautionary
point in her discussion in the Wall Street Journal of Internet reporting during the Games. While
Internet sources might be expected to provide different perspectives on the Olympics, unauthorized
critical comments about sensitive Olympic topics were quickly removed from the Internet. At the same
time, media reports from official agencies were released quickly. The point of Chinese censorship now
is less to stop the flow of sensitive news than to shape a dominant message.
Japanese papers also contrasted the rhetoric of “harmony” in the Chinese media with the “reality” of
ongoing troubles in the Western regions of China and problems faced by ordinary residents on the day
after the closing ceremonies. AnAsahi article entitled “‘Successful’ Olympics, a different reality” (Aug.
25, 2008, p. 2) described the continuing repression of the Tibetan and Uighur minorities, as well as
restrictions on the movement of ordinary Beijing citizens. The Yomiuri also reported on the Beijingers’
ironic appropriation of the political slogan “harmonious society” through the creation of a new verb “to
be harmonized” to describe situations in which people are forced to move their homes or otherwise
sacrifice their self-interests for state-imposed goals such as the Olympics (“Increasing Patriotism” Aug.
25, 2008, p. 4).
Although not always negative, Japanese editorial voices in general seem unconvinced of Chinese
sincerity and thus especially sensitive to stories of Chinese “fakes.” While the Western media
frequently reported on the “friendliness” of the Beijing residents, Japanese media reported on better
“manners” (such as waiting in line), implying that these improvements in public behavior, like
improvements in air quality, might not last beyond the state-sponsored spectacle of the Olympics.
Man-made good weather and manipulated positive media coverage are all represented as troubling
signs of a neighbor that is “trying too hard” and is thus untrustworthy.
It might surprise Western critics to read Japanese commentators positioning themselves as champions
of democracy and individualism in China, but this focus on Chinese “fakery” and “collectivism” can also
be seen as part of Japan’s long history of positioning itself as a modern enlightened nation in a
Western-dominated global society. Ironically, Japanese criticisms of Chinese fakery, authoritarianism,
and collectivism closely resemble Western criticism of Japanese “copying” and a state-dominated
“Japan Inc.” during its rapid growth period of the 1970s and ’80s. These obsessions tell us as much as
about Japanese sensitivities as about the state of Chinese society. Indeed, one of the questions
Japanese commentators ask is whether Tokyo really has an authentic vision for the 2016 Olympic bid,
or more broadly, whether Japan has any viable vision for its future at all.
“One World” (revisited): Flexible Olympic citizenship
One story covered on the front page of all major Japanese dailies the day after the closing ceremonies
was a tribute to the Japanese background of Kenya’s Samuel Wanjiru, who was awarded the gold
medal for the marathon during the closing ceremonies. Wanjiru began his serious training as a high
school student in Japan, and thus could be hailed by the Japanese media as a Japanese success story
as well as a Kenyan success story. In a similar fashion, Japanese media also hailed the success of the
Japanese coach Imura Masayo, who led China’s synchronized swimmers to a bronze medal—the
team’s first.
Japanese and Western media have provided numerous stories of mobile athletes and coaches
swapping national affiliations all over the world. America’s silver medal in volleyball was led by China’s
former star player Lang Ping, who was wildly cheered by Chinese fans. Russia’s bronze medal–winning
women’s basketball team was led by American, and naturalized Russian citizen, Becky Hammon.
Georgia’s beach volleyball team hailed from Brazil. America’s women’s gymnastic coach Liang Chow
hailed from the host city of Beijing. Fans are getting used to the mobility of athletic careers.
Extensive media coverage of these mobile sports figures belies the nationalist mythology that most
media reporting exalts (including Japanese media). The cross-border movements of Olympic athletes
and coaches are a better expression of the fluid conditions of modern transnational citizenship than

the hard nationalism of mainstream media coverage. And despite the simple-minded nationalism of
sports coverage, audiences throughout the world have also became willing to embrace the forms of
“flexible citizenship”—as anthropologist Aihwa Ong calls them—exhibited by mobile athletic stars. As
more athletes and coaches cross borders, perhaps the hypernationalism of sports will be undermined
by the multinational self-representations of the athletes themselves, offering a much more progressive
vision of a true “one world” that allows individuals to pursue their cross-border dreams regardless of
their place of birth.
“One Dream” (revisited): Olympic Eros
When asked about the Beijing opening ceremony, Tokyo’s conservative governor Ishihara Shintaro,
who is not known for circumspection, said: “I suppose it’s a happy occasion, something you can be
proud of. But it was also like passing around the same Chinese dish for three people. It was a bit
boring and too long” (Asahi Shimbun, August 19, 2008, p. 32, “The words of the mayor”).
Ishihara may have been one of the few in Japan who were underwhelmed by the beauty of the
opening ceremonies, which he labeled “mass games.” Such inopportune comments can be taken as
further evidence of his disregard for global public opinion, including a statement on the same day that
visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine by the Tokyo governor also would have no effect on the
Olympic bid. His well-known nationalist rhetoric aside, when describing his response to the sporting
events Ishihara also revealed his more literary side: “Actually, [sports] are not about Logos, or
language, but the world of Eros. They are about physical beauty.”
Although Ishihara’s comments about “Logos” seemed directed at Zhang Yimou’s highly textual
imagery in the opening ceremonies (based on the metaphor of a scroll and the advent of printing),
Ishihara’s larger point seems to refute his casual dismissal of the opening ceremony as “boring.” After
all, it was the extraordinary visceral beauty of the opening and closing ceremonies, rather than their
simplistic narratives, that made the Games such a huge success in the eyes of the global audience,
including the thrilled NHK announcers. And it was the vicarious ecstasy of the athletic performances
experienced on high definition television that inspired such large global audiences. Discussions of the
physical beauty of the athletes themselves were also one of the most non-nationalistic global
discourses on the Internet. Eroticism, in its more direct sense, was also part of the experience of the
Games for many athletes, who apparently engaged in a great deal of cross-national bed hopping. For
some, at least, the private experience of the Olympics was not at all a case of “one bed, different
dreams,” but rather of the victory of Eros over Logos.
To return then to idea of “one dream,” when Ishihara suggests that the Olympics involve a
fundamentally aesthetic vision, perhaps he should also remind himself that the fact that the Chinese
state was willing to spend seven years and $40 billion on an essentially aesthetic experience is itself a
reassuringly peaceful expression of a shared human dream. Perhaps the legacy of the Beijing
Olympics will be primarily aesthetic, not political, and that’s not a bad legacy (especially, as Thomas
Friedman points out, when compared to the legacy of America’s past seven years).
Whether Beijing’s expensive spectacle of Olympian Eros was purchased at the cost of other more
fundamental human needs is obviously debatable within China. But whether Tokyo can offer an
equally compelling alternative vision for 2016 remains doubtful for most Japanese. When asked
whether the ceremonies in Beijing gave him any ideas for Tokyo’s bid, the mayor said, “Not really, we
want to do something totally different, if given the chance.” What that difference will be is still unclear
to most Japanese.
Tokyo is obviously a great global city, with the best urban infrastructure, public safety, and global
cuisine in the world. It is deserving of a second Olympics, but it is also deserving of more progressive
global representations from its media and politicians. Ishihara is clever, charismatic, and quotable,
and clearly a relief from the leaden boredom of most Japanese political voices, but with such a figure
at the helm, Tokyo’s Olympic bid faces an uphill battle for global recognition.
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